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MOOT POINTS IN SOCIOLOGY.

II. SOCIAL LAWS.

THE quick mastery of things that science assures us is due to the fact that science presents all comers with truth packed away in neat portable formulæ. The strength of an ox in a tea-cup, the virtue of a beef-steak in a capsule, the healing power of a plant in a pellet—such is the ideal of the investigator as he labors to establish laws. No branch is felt to possess in high degree the scientific quality unless it has found regularities and constant relations among the phenomena it contemplates. In dealing with the more complex phenomena, to be sure, some of the precision and absoluteness of physical and chemical laws must be renounced. Out of the tangled skein we shall rarely get anything better than an empirical law. Few, indeed, are the formulæ that can be so phrased as to hold for all occasions and circumstances. But this has not discouraged the biologist or the sociologist from trying to distil into vest-pocket phials the tincture and essence of innumerable cases. It is our present purpose to sample and test the shelf of phials purporting to contain the quintessences of social facts.

Sociology differs from its older sister sciences in that it was built by great synthesists—Comte, Spencer, Lilienfeld, Schäffle, de Roberty, and Fouillée—all of them more renowned for their wide acquaintance with many provinces of knowledge than for their close familiarity with any particular division of social facts. In their spacious philosophic surveys, all of them came upon the same great cantle of unknown territory, and in their endeavor to stake off and explore this expanse they created sociology. It is true this region was not quite a wilderness, having been occupied in spots by the economists. But to their achievements the philosophers paid about as much heed as the early explorers of America paid to the constructions of the mound-builders.

The philosophers, no doubt, hastened the day of sociology, but they burdened the infant science with two faulty methods.

One is the fondness for the objective statement of the behavior of associated men in preference to the subjective interpretation. The other is the excessive reliance upon superficial analogies between social facts and other facts. Owing to these errors the earlier formulations of social law are not based upon the accumulation and comparison of social data, but are built out laterally from the more advanced neighboring sciences. Sociology is at first a balcony—or shall I say a “lean-to”?—projecting from physics or biology or psychology.

The first notable example is Mr. Spencer’s demonstration that the various propositions which make up his grand law of evolution apply to society.

That *motion follows the line of least resistance* is as true, he says, for societies as for molecules. He instances the congregating of men at places of abundant food supply, the lines of migration, the growth of industrial centers, the location of trade routes and many other economic facts. Now, this proposition can hold only in so far as men *economize*. If there is a *play* side as well as a *work* side to human life, if men are squanderers of energy as as well as economizers of energy, they will not follow lines of least resistance. The development of games and social festivity, the self-expression of artistic and religious activity, as well as the devotion to sport, adventure, and exploration, show that there is such a thing as a *surplus* of human energy.

But even economic men do not follow “the line of least resistance” in the same way as molecules. Compare the path of a flood with that of an army. Water will meander a score of leagues to find an outlet but a furlong away. An army clambers over an intervening ridge to reach its objective. Each moment of its course the river follows the line easiest *at that moment*. Man knows his goal and, having foresight, takes the line that *on the whole* is easiest. This is why man leads water by much straighter channels to its destination than nature does.

The thesis that *societies*, like all other aggregates, *pass from less coherence to more coherence* (law of integration) is tenable enough, but the explanation of the process is unsatisfactory. Mr. Spencer apparently lays it to the interdependence resulting

from the division of labor. But later thinkers account otherwise for the undoubted integration of men into larger and larger social wholes. Gumpłowicz derives it from the law that *every group strives to utilize all weaker groups within its reach*. From this result war, conquest, absorption, and finally the fusing of conquerors and conquered into one people ready to repeat the process with some other people similarly formed. Tarde, on the other hand—the St. John among sociologists—finds the cause of integration not so much in the constrained association of victors and vanquished as in that peaceful intercourse between contiguous groups which promotes reciprocal imitation, creates a common plane of culture, and fits them to enter easily into a larger human synthesis.

Mr. Spencer's law that, like the Cosmos, *society passes from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous* (law of differentiation) is open to the gravest objections. The illustrations are all taken from the active and especially the vocational side of life. Now, it is true that in a plastic society men specialize more and more with reference to the performance of unlike tasks; but while they become more unlike as producers, they become more like as consumers. The longer men dwell together, the more readily they respond to powerful currents of imitation which assimilate them in their tastes, desires, and ideals. The sway of custom or fashion proclaims *the instability of the heterogeneous*. The triumph of a national speech, religion, patriotism, music, costume, or sport over old provincial and local diversities is unquestionably a more pregnant fact in social history than is the specialization of employments.

If Mr. Spencer's illustrations of the march of heterogeneity are taken too exclusively from the industrial sphere, he falls into just the opposite error when he strives to prove that *societies show increasing definiteness of arrangement*. He draws all his facts from the State, Church, and Law, from those spheres which touch social order and therefore exhibit the greatest sharpness of outline and rigidity of form. Moreover, he cites from composite societies where there are castes corresponding to races anciently stratified, and where the iron distinctions of function and occupation are a heritage from successive conquests.

Notice the fact that Mr. Spencer, after seeking to prove the preceding thesis from a *plastic* society would prove his present thesis from an *ossified* society, a tacit admission that the laws in question do not apply to all social groups. It is true that a community long undisturbed is likely to exhibit crystallization and rigidity. But it is no less true that a community agitated by inventions, migration, conquest, or culture-contacts exhibits fluidity and vicariousness of function. Here there is great instability of political and social position, great facility of individual ascent and descent, a rapid subversion of old fortunes by new wealth, of old classes by new groupings, of old inventions by new standards and values.

Against the proposition that *in society*, as elsewhere, *a single cause produces a number of unlike effects* (law of the multiplication of effects), there is nothing to be said.

The statement that *incident forces tend to collect the like and to separate the unlike* (law of segregation), is doubtless as true of people as it is of particles. Nevertheless, by implying that human segregation is the result of "incident" forces it veils the real reason why like joins with like. That the recognition of resemblance inspires a fellow-feeling which unites men into unlike groups is a *psychical* fact and nothing is gained by assimilating it with purely *physical* processes like the sorting of particles by wind, or water, or electrical attraction.

The thesis that *social evolution tends toward a more perfect equilibrium* (law of equilibration) does not seem to be justified by Mr. Spencer's evidence. It is true that electricity and steam are facilitating the adjustment of economic supply to demand, but it is likewise true that the increasing use of fixed capital entails only too frequently that rupture between supply and demand which we call a commercial crisis. As for what he styles the better equilibration between the demand for government and the supply of it, *i. e.*, the lessening oscillation between revolution and reaction, one questions if it is at all bound up with the social process. It appears rather to be a natural consequence of the growth of capitalism on the one hand and the diffusion of knowledge on the other. To say nothing of disturbances arising

from general causes such as the unequal fecundity of classes, races, or nations, it is evident that, until every Peter the Hermit, Gutenberg, Watt, or Napoleon is strangled in the cradle, society will never long remain in balance.

This case admirably exemplifies the danger of formulating social laws on hints from other sciences. The law may be true, yet if there is no patient digging into social facts to get at the root of the matter, *i. e.*, to uncover *the specific cause* of the observed tendency, one is likely to state as valid, for all times and all societies, something that holds only since the decline of the tribal system, the advent of gunpowder, or the prevalence of machine industry.

Although during the interval between *First Principles* and his *Principles of Sociology* Mr. Spencer grew cautious in the use of analogy, and came to prefer the laws of life to the laws of matter as the key to social processes, his treatment of society as a mass rather than a consensus, as an aggregate of bodies rather than an accord of minds, had meanwhile given much encouragement to social physicists. The most extreme of these is Carey, whose maxims, "All science is one and indivisible" and "The laws of physical science are equally those of social science" would throttle sociology in its infancy. To the combinations of men he applies the chemical law of multiple proportions, and the physical law of the composition of forces. From the law of gravitation he deduces that *the attraction of cities is directly as the mass and inversely as the distance!*

Writing early in the seventies at a time when the philosophical world was profoundly stirred by new and splendid generalizations in the field of life, Lilienfeld seeks to bring society under biological rather than physical laws. He insists that society is a "real organism," and declares, "It is an unscientific, dualistic dogma which asserts that human society develops according to other laws than natural organisms."

Following Haeckel's thesis that among the existing species of organisms can be found types corresponding to the successive forms by which in the past the higher species developed out of a simple cell, Lilienfeld lays down the law that *within any social*

group can be found coexisting all the types of culture traversed by man in his ascent from savagery. As an illustration of this grandiose "Law of Parallelism" he adduces the fact that older and inferior agencies of transportation—pack mule, stage coach, sailing vessel—persist alongside of later and higher agencies. Alas for hollow phrases, the explanation of the fact lies in quite another quarter! In every society there are transportation routes of every degree of importance. On routes of little traffic the earlier and technically inferior means of carriage, the pack train or the stage coach, is economically superior and is therefore retained. Hence the diversity.

But go deeper yet. In weaving or metal working or any branch of manufacture we do not find primitive appliances surviving as we do in transportation. Why is this? Simply because the agent of transportation produces a service and not a commodity. Seeing that a service must always be supplied by an agency on the spot, the Eastern four-track railroad cannot supplant the Arizona mule team in the same way that the Minneapolis flour mill supplants the local grist mill.

From the law that the embryo of a creature recapitulates in its development the entire life history of the species Lilienfeld infers analogically that *the individual in his development from childhood passes through the culture epochs traversed by human society.* But is this sound? The embryo recapitulates the development history of its species from force of heredity. As Haeckel puts it, "Phylogeny is the mechanical cause of ontogeny." Now the course of historical development in no wise determines personal development. The boy does not camp out because his ancestors did so in Cæsar's time. Racial experiences of cave-dwelling, hunting and barter cannot get into the blood. The correspondence, if it exists, can be explained only by assuming that the stages of social ascent are determined by the stages of mental evolution; that culture epochs answer to the gradations in the intellectual life of mankind; that the thinking of savages is child-like, of barbarians is boy-like, of civilization is man-like. It is vain, however, to correlate closely the actual course of evolution of a society with intellectual development, seeing that so many other

factors influence it, *e. g.*, the character of the geographical environment, the movement of population, contact with and borrowing from other societies, the presence or absence of inventive geniuses.

De Greef is another of those who work out from the adjacent built-up sciences. He prefers to project a generalization cantilever-fashion over the vacant lot, rather than to delve and lay deep a firm foundation in the social soil itself.

From the general principle that *aggregates are variable in proportion to the heterogeneity of their parts*, he infers that society will be more plastic than an organism, seeing that it is larger and more differentiated than the latter. But why make a simple matter so hard? A society can change more than an organism, because its units are *thinking persons* and not *blind cells*. The clamp of custom, moreover, is by no means so firm as the grip of heredity.

It is a well-known fact that, whereas Athens, Corinth, Thebes and other Greek communities passed through the same series of political forms—patriarchal, monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic—their colonies in Asia Minor and elsewhere skipped the earlier stages and began their existence with the political form of the mother city. This natural and sensible proceeding strikes De Greef as an illustration of the law that *the development of the embryo recapitulates the development of the species!*

In like vein a recent champion of "parallelism" (Collier) discovers a grand "Law of the Evolution of Colonies." "Up to the point in the growth of a colony when it ceases to be dependent on its metropolis, the political and social evolution recapitulates in a few years the entire evolution which the mother country may have taken centuries to accomplish."

Well may the economist gibe at such sociology! The development of the mother country has, forsooth, no more to do with the development of the colony than has the Dog Star. The cause of the resemblance is the fact that new countries begin with a sparse population which gradually becomes dense. Hence the sequence of hunting, pastoralism, agriculture, industry. Hence the minor sequences of barter, merchandise money,

coined money, and credit, of pastoral feudalism, plantation slavery, and the wage system. The slow growth of religion, learning, and literature is due simply to lack of numbers, of intercourse, of leisure, and of cities. The irregularity of sex relations in a colony is not an echo of primitive times, but the consequence of the lack of white women and the abundance of native women. There is no "law" discernible here save the law that, for colony as well as for mother country, *the increase of population relatively to resources is a prime cause of social evolution.*

In searching for the law of social decadence De Greef, instead of interrogating the history of declining nations, makes wide excursions into biology and psychology. He is struck by the law that the organs and characters recently acquired by a species are less stable and more liable to disappear than the older parts more deeply rooted in heredity. Something very similar is true of the mind. It appears that in mental disease, senility, asphyxia, or dissolution, the higher, more complex, and more special faculties disappear before the lower, simpler, and more automatic processes. As Ribot puts it: "Mental dissolution follows the inverse order of evolution, the more complex voluntary manifestations ceasing before the simpler, and these before the automatic actions."

Extended to society this principle yields the law that *those traits and institutions most special, complex, and recently acquired are the first to disappear when social decadence sets in.* Now, is there really anything at all in this law? It is true that the later-acquired practices and institutions are unstable until they have become fixed in the custom of the folk. Nevertheless, in not all societies is custom strong. Where it is strong, the more recently adopted institutions may be the last to be surrendered, because they are most suited to present needs; whereas the more ancient institutions, being already partly obsolescent, are the first to go when the strain comes. Adversity is a test of the old rather than of the recent.

Nor does the law seem to apply, as De Greef supposes, to the various orders of social facts. A religion begins with a faith and later adds thereunto a liturgy. But when the religion

decays the liturgy is not the first to go but the last. An art beginning with an ideal acquires in time a technique; but the technique, exaggerated into a mannerism, persists long after the ideal has vanished.

The hard-headed, clear-sighted Gumpłowicz studies his facts first hand and has no faith in long-range deductions from neighboring sciences. He believes, however, that there are certain laws which hold equally for the inorganic, vital, psychic, and social spheres of phenomena. Before proceeding to establish specific social laws Gumpłowicz briefly indicates ten universal laws, the recognition of which in the realm of social phenomena justifies one's faith in the possibility of a social science. We may compress them into the following seven:

1. For every phenomenon there is an adequate cause.
2. Phenomena run in sequences.
3. These sequences are law-abiding.
4. Concrete objects have parts.
5. A developmental process is initiated by the contact or conflict of unlike elements.
6. Forces differ only in strength and direction.
7. Identical forces produce similar effects.

The Austrian thinker does not illustrate these laws, and, as they are exceedingly abstract and general, we may safely accept them. His fifth law, be it noted, is one of the most fruitful principles to be found in modern sociology and under the name of "synergy" has been greatly developed by Dr. Ward.

We have tested the application to society of physical, biological and psychological laws and have seen that the method does not yield lasting results. All this work will have to be torn out and replaced by better masonry if the walls of sociology are to rise very far. No one denies that the extension into the social sphere of regularities discovered in other fields has greatly helped to bring order out of chaos. It is better to interpret the career of a nation analogically, than to interpret it providentially, as did the old "philosophy of history." Analogy has suggested what to look for. It has taught us to notice similarities and to segregate like phenomena. To its life lines we

have clung while exploring the unfamiliar social deeps. It is certain, however, that no recognized science borrows its laws from other departments of knowledge. The lasting possessions of sociology will be regularities which, instead of being imported from without, have been discovered by patiently comparing social facts among themselves.

With Analogy has gone the vice of Exteriority. The social group has been studied from the outside as if it were a nebula, a crystal, or an ovule. But in the study of nature this reliance upon sheer observation is not a sign of strength but a confession of limits. How differently we should conceive the tasks of crystallography if we could question the molecules and learn just why they comport themselves as they do! How otherwise we should describe chemical processes if the atoms could tell us of the "affinities" they obey! Not all our observations of the canals of Mars are worth for science a five minutes' interview with the Martian Commissioner of Public Works. Now, by contenting himself with uniformities instead of causes the sociologist, with his "law of differentiation" or "law of parallelism" lightly renounces at a stroke the enormous advantage of living inside of society and knowing just why its units behave as they do.

We want to know causes, and the cause of a collective phenomenon must be something that influences behavior. Society is, indeed, not the temple of reason but neither is it the theater of mechanical forces. There is little important human action which is wholly blind and unconscious. A causative interpretation of social facts must consider the thoughts and the feelings of the units whose behavior is to be explained. Until they are adequately motivated common beliefs or actions have not been accounted for. Now, after eschewing analogy sociologists did not at once proceed, as they should have done, to seek the *causes, i. e.*, the motivation of occurrences. They dallied away precious time at a half-way house we may call the Genetic Interpretation.

The aim of the genetic sociologist is not to show why, under the

circumstances and taking folks as they are, a given institution exists, but to establish *a law of sequence* within each department of social life. Morgan insists that there have been five successive types of family, and that the order of appearance has been everywhere the same. Gumpłowicz avers that there is "a strictly regular development from fetishism through anthropomorphism, polytheism, and monotheism, to the atheism of free thinkers." Letourneau declares that politically "human societies evolve regularly by successive stages which are anarchy, the communal clan, the tribe, at first republican, later aristocratic, then monarchy, at first elective and later hereditary. Finally certain élite peoples repudiate monarchy and return to a régime republican but very unlike that of the primitive tribe." De Greef sets up as the law of æsthetic development that "architecture always precedes sculpture, and sculpture precedes painting."

Now formulæ of this sort not only quarrel scandalously with historical facts, but they rest on wrong notions of social causation.

Today we can foretell the series of transformations through which a human being will pass from the earliest embryo stage on. Tomorrow we shall be charting his mental evolution from the first weeks of infancy to the end of adolescence. In vain, however, does the sociologist aspire to do for society what the embryologist does for the body, and the genetic psychologist for the mind. The organism obeys the wand of heredity, but society has no heredity. It is not unfolding what was once folded into it, as the embryo unfolds the predetermined parts and organs. Institutions have not developed, as Morgan suggests, from "a few primary germs of thought." "In any order of social facts," says Tarde, "evolution takes place by successive insertions . . . thereby making the course of progress not a smooth, gentle, upward slope, but a ladder with rungs at very unequal distances." Far from traveling a common highway the peoples have followed routes as various as have been their conditions of life.

If the genetic sociologist does not conceive of an institution as having an "organic development" of its own, he is very liable

to conceive it as exhibiting continuous improvement, like a tool or a utensil. The succession of political forms is regarded as a perfecting of government, of domestic types as a perfecting of the family, of industrial systems as a perfecting of economy. Hence attractive sequences, such as autocracy, aristocracy, democracy; promiscuity, polygamy, monogamy; slavery, serfdom, free labor! Each form is "higher" than the preceding, and the series is never reversed. We can therefore arrive at a "law" for each ascending series.

But the actual series of forms is sometimes neither "evolution" nor "progress." One will be disappointed if he looks either for a uniform evolution of the family from "the small, incoherent, and indefinite" to "the large, coherent, definite, and complex," or for a steady progress from the ethically "lower" to the ethically "higher." In its metamorphoses the family is not piloted by the ethical ideal, nor does it exhibit an evolution of its own. It follows closely economic changes. "To every type of economy," concludes Grosse, "there corresponds a particular type of family." Thus polygyny thrives most where men control the source of the food supply; monogamy where woman has a certain food-getting capacity. The family is strictly patriarchal with the pastoral nomads; the matriarchate appears only when the woman disposes over economic resources of her own. Among hunters and pastoralists the clan will be paternal. In the Lower Agriculture it is often maternal. If now the family form is intimately sympathetic with the economy of a people, and if in the succession of these economies there is no fixed order—some hunters skipping the pastoral stage to become tillers, some nomads skipping the tillage stage to become carriers or traders—how will it be possible to establish an invariable sequence in domestic development?

Vain, likewise, is it to frame a universal law for the succession of political forms. These forms are not so many stages in the perfecting of government but are adapted each to the prevailing economy, the makeup of the population, or the relation of the group to neighboring groups. Suppose the writer is justified in his thesis that political power becomes concentrated during a

static epoch, when there is great inequality of economic opportunity coinciding with great inequality of possessions, and that it becomes diffused during a dynamic epoch when the doors of opportunity stand open to all. Suppose Professor Giddings is right in declaring that political forms will be coercive if society embraces marked diversities and inequalities in its membership, liberal if between its members there is great moral and mental resemblance. Suppose Gumplowicz is right in asserting that the state is most oligarchic and coercive just after a conquest, and that as the assimilation of conquerors and conquered proceeds it becomes more mild and liberal. No one granting any of these suppositions will venture, as does Letourneau, to contend for a fixed sequence in political forms. For if political evolution is at the mercy of general social evolution, it will not be the same for all peoples unless general social evolution is the same for all peoples.

But *is* general social evolution the same for all peoples?

There is, to be sure, one great cause of uniformity in the order of experiences in different societies. Seeing that the human mind is at bottom everywhere the same, those developments which have *inner* rather than *outer* causes are likely to run parallel, even with peoples remote from one another in space or time, to follow, as it were, a series of logical steps. A science—mathematics or astronomy, for instance—pursues everywhere the same course. The same problems present themselves to all, and are solved, if solved they are, in much the same order. However varied their surroundings all tribes flounder through animism, invent similar myths, or travel the same route of speculation. It is not by chance that in the early developments of speech, of sex-life, of the practical arts, of ceremonies, symbols, and games, we come across those deeply worn paths which Tyler has called “ethnographic parallels.”

Regularity, then, will naturally characterize those species of social phenomena which are functions of man’s thinking, and respond least to outer circumstance. The linguistic, æsthetic, mythological, folk-lore, philosophic, scientific, and technological developments have in them too much of the subjective not to

repeat themselves under different skies and in diverse settings. There is, moreover, in ethical, religious, and juridical development, an assimilating subjective factor working along with external factors. But we cannot venture so far as did Comte generalizing from his extensive studies in the history of the sciences. Had his acquaintance with the metamorphoses of institutions been wider, he would not have concluded that—as Mill puts it—“the order of human progression in all respects will be a corollary deducible from the order of progression in the intellectual convictions of mankind.”

For there are classes of social phenomena that are more objectively determined, and these do not easily lend themselves to laws of succession. Data vastly fuller than Comte had at his disposal force upon us the conviction that the coarse structural facts of society do not obey the lead of mind. The industrial, domestic, military, political and ecclesiastical institutions do not follow the same course for all peoples, but develop in thralldom to outer conditions—in the final analysis, to the environment, physical or human. Desert, steppe, forest, valley, seaport—each working, be it noted, not directly but through the demographic and economic factors, moulds a social type which will undergo certain transformations of its own. Then, too, much depends upon access to alien social groups. The presence or absence of other societies and cultures decides whether a people shall stagnate or progress, be militant or industrial, develop as a simple or as a composite society.

We may, in fact, think of society as developing with reference to two foci, the *subjective* and the *objective*. The unfolding of the mind being apparently the same among different peoples, those social phenomena which lie nearest the subjective focus will exhibit in their transformations a certain logic and regularity. Environments, on the other hand, impose modes of existence extremely unlike, and therefore in differently situated social groups those social phenomena lying nearest the objective focus will undergo not parallel but divergent evolution.

Moreover, owing to the fact that from the very unity of the mind every culture stage presents itself as a whole, in which each

element acts upon every other element; owing to the fact that the forms of industry, of family, of government, of law, of worship, and of art, are sympathetically adjusted to one another, it is likely that even the forms about the subjective pole—art, philosophy, religion, and the like—will be tinged with something local and distinctive. Hence, I cannot but conclude that the development of a particular order of institutions is, in a greater or less degree, *multilinear*, and that the endeavor to establish in each sphere of social life a single, typical sequence of changes is bound to fail.

For a different reason we reject formulations like De Greef's law of the development of exchange, viz., that merchandise money gives way to weighed metallic money, this to coined metallic money, this in turn to the bank note, and the bank note to the clearing-house set-off. The succession here is indubitable, but have we a law? If we raise to the dignity of a law the series of steps in the perfecting of any instrument or process, social laws will be cheap. There will be volumes of them. The history of the arts furnishes us with formulæ for the evolution of the plow, the pot, the gun, the loom, the process of weaving, of smelting, of brewing, and of hundreds of other practical items. Does anyone care to make these the building stones of a science of society?

Let no one suppose that the foregoing aims to bar out true dynamic laws disclosing a chain of cause and effect. It is because an institutional form is not the *cause* of its successor that we cannot admit a law of succession for each aspect of social evolution. But there is no objection to formulating the relation between a prime motor of social change, and the developmental process it initiates, between the leaping spark and the train of consequences it ignites. We can, therefore, welcome as a foundation pier of sociology the law established by Gumpłowicz and Ratzenhofer that *the conjugation of two societies through conquest and subjection is followed by a rapid evolution of structure*, and the law of cross-fertilization adumbrated by Buckle and Tarde and formulated thus by Tiele: "*All (spiritual) development, apart from the natural capabilities of men and peoples, results from the stimulus*

given to self-consciousness by contact with a different stage of development, whether higher or lower." Spencer's dictum, that increase of social mass is followed by greater differentiation and higher organization, can be adopted in the amended form suggested by Durkheim. "*The division of labor varies directly as the size and density of society, and if it progresses continually in the course of social development, it is because societies become regularly denser and generally larger.*" With the time-honored thesis that *as the arts are perfected the state of society becomes less dependent on local conditions*, may, perhaps, be joined Patten's law that *as a race emerges from a local environment into a general environment a pain economy gives way to a pleasure economy*.

Besides the agencies of social change the operation of which is recognized in the foregoing laws, there is the movement of the human intellect to be reckoned with. Ward's law that *spontaneous progress gives way to telic progress and individual telesis in turn yields relatively to collective telesis*, expresses better even than Comte's famous formula the necessary course of intellectual evolution, because it is founded on the demonstrable tendency of an expanding intelligence to substitute the indirect method of obtaining ends for the direct method.

The most promising field for the discovery of valid laws is, however, the coexistence of social phenomena, rather than their succession. In social life, what goes with what? Which phenomena *always* occur together or *never* occur together? Of these laws of coexistence the less ambitious relate to the mode of occurrence of phenomena. As examples of such *laws of manifestation* may be cited Giddings's proposition that "*Impulsive social action tends to extend and intensify in a geometrical progression,*" and Tarde's thesis that *imitations proceed from the reputed superior to the reputed inferior*.

Other correlations are expressed in *laws of repugnance*. Thus Ward announces that *the less a type is specialized the more likely it is to persist*. Tarde asserts that *where custom-imitation is strong, mode-imitation is weak, and vice versa*. Durkheim concludes that *suicide of the egoistic type "varies inversely with the degree of integration of the social group to which the individual belongs."* Giddings

declares that "*Impulsive social action varies inversely with the habit of attaining ends by indirect and complex means,*" and that "*The degree of sympathy decreases as the generality of resemblance increases.*" The writer believes it safe to assert that *the more prevalent the man-to-man struggle in a society, the less pronounced is the group-to-group struggle.*

The typical relation, however, that the investigator aspires to establish is that of cause and effect. The number of such relations established is a true measure of scientific advancement, and it is therefore a great pity that a generation of sociologists spent their time gathering the Dead Sea fruit of analogical and genetic laws, instead of seeking those *laws of causation* which are the peculiar treasure of a science. Within the last dozen years, however, scholars have thrown themselves into the quest for true causes, and their gains have availed to take away from sociology the reproach of barrenness. Those spokesmen of the more developed branches of knowledge who, because of her early errors of method, dispute the youngest of the sciences her rightful place, are simply ignorant of what is being done.

We have Tarde with such laws as *Tradition is authoritative and coercive in proportion to its antiquity*, and *The likelihood of a given invention varies directly as the number of minds possessing and capable of fusing the ideas composing it, and inversely as the number of antecedent inventions necessary to be made.* With regard to social organization Giddings sets up two laws, one that it is coercive *in proportion as the population is heterogeneous*, and the other that it is coercive *in proportion as sympathetic and formal like-mindedness predominates over deliberative like-mindedness.*

Veblen has established the *vielsagend* law that *in proportion as a leisure-class becomes influential, the reigning standards of right, of decency, of beauty, and of ritualistic fitness, conform to the principle of Conspicuous Waste.* Bouglè has won ground from the ideologists by proving that *notions of human equality make their way in proportion as society becomes large, dense, mobile, complex, and unified.* Miss Simons has formulated for assimilation five laws which so thoroughly reveal the process that the subject is for the present done with. The writer, in addition to the laws he has formu-

lated in *Social Control*, believes the following to be true: *Social order is stable in proportion as the power of each to resist exceeds his power to aggress, and his will to resist exceeds his will to aggress.*

Although some set up a *law* for any constant relation discovered between facts, the usage of the long established sciences restricts the term "law" to the relation between facts of variation. The relation between one set of unvarying facts and another set is expressed in a *generalization*. Of valuable formulæ of this kind the progress of sociology furnishes numerous examples. There is Buckle's thesis, that *intellectual progress rather than moral progress is the driving force of civilization*. Recall Spencer's conclusion that *the kind of activities (militant or industrial) predominant in a society determine the type of military or industrial organization, the principles of law, the spirit of religious and ethical ideals, and the status of the weak*. Ratzenhofer sets up the proposition that *conquest and subjection entail necessarily the passage from the tribal to the civil organization*. Tiele avers that *the influence of general development manifests itself later in religion than in any other department of human life*. Dr. Ward has made it clear that *social structures are the products of the interaction of unlike social forces*, and sets us right as to method with the principle that *in the complex sciences the quality of exactness is perceptible only in their higher generalizations*. De Greef is convinced that *the more general social phenomena determine in a general way the more special social phenomena*. Tarde has demonstrated that *imitations are refracted by their media*, and that *imitation is unilateral before it is reciprocal*.

Such are the principal formulæ contributed by sociology to the common stock of scientific truth. When these have been criticised, broken up and recast half a dozen times, we shall begin to possess a stable body of doctrine. The exhibit certainly ought to reassure all sociologists. "The lips of the morning are reddening." Shafts of light pierce the jungle in many directions. Every year sees new roads and clearings, and the time draws near when the whole region will lie open to the day.

The question sometimes arises as to whether a certain law is to be counted to sociology or to economics, politics, or jurispru-

dence. It seems well to apply here De Greef's distinction between *simple* and *compound* laws, the former expressing relations between phenomena of the same class, the latter relations between phenomena of different classes. When we unite two economic facts, as in the proposition that *the investment of capital varies directly with the rate of interest*, we have an economic law. When we unite two political facts, as in the proposition that *as national oppositions grow, party oppositions weaken*, we have a law of political science. When, on the other hand, we join a political to an economic fact, as in the proposition that *with the diffusion of economic opportunity the tension between classes declines*, we have a social law. By the same right we may count as social Robertson Smith's law that *the rise of a commonwealth or hierarchy of gods follows step by step the coalescence of small social groups into larger unities*, and Nieboer's generalization that "*Slavery as an industrial system is not likely to exist where subsistence depends on natural resources which are present in limited quantity.*"

In general, however, the typical social law is not the statement of a relation between facts of different classes. It is more apt to develop a fundamental truth underlying, rather than connecting, the special social sciences. The action of one ethnic group upon another as formulated in Gumpłowicz's law is determinative of political, military, economic, and domestic facts. In other words the law discloses a basic truth. Veblen's principle is of equal interest for ethics, æsthetics, and the science of religion. The laws of imitation formulated by Tarde are helpful to the linguist as well as to the economist, to the demographer as well as to the political scientist. Many of Professor Giddings's laws disclose characteristics of all manner of associations, or tendencies present in all departments of social life. In sooth, an inventory of its results convinces one that sociology is not so much a sister science to politics or jurisprudence, as a fundamental and comprehensive discipline uniting at the base all the social sciences.

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[*To be continued.*]